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The Powers in PowerPoint:  Embedded authorities, documentary tastes, and institutional 
(second) orders in corporate Korea 
Michael M. Prentice 
Brandeis University 
 
Abstract 
Microsoft PowerPoint is both the bane and banality of contemporary South Korean office work. 
Corporate workers spend countless hours refining and crafting plans, proposals, and reports in 
PowerPoint that often lead to conflicts with coworkers and overtime work. This article theorizes 
the excessive attention to documents in modern office contexts. Where scholars have been under 
the impression that institutional documents align with institutional purposes, I describe a context 
in which making documents for individual purposes and making them for work exist under a 
basic tension. Based on fieldwork in corporate Korea between 2013 and 2015, I describe how 
Korean office workers calibrate documents to the tastes of superiors who populate the 
managerial chain. These practiceVOHDYHOLWWOHWUDFHRIUHDO³ZRUN´RQSDSHUEXWWKH\DUH
productive for navigating complex internal labor markets and demonstrating a higher order value 
of attention toward others. These findings suggest that institutional and individual authorities are 
not competing projects inside organizations but become entangled in increasingly complex 
participatory encounters, even as they are channeled through a seemingly simple software like 
PowerPoint. 
 
Keywords: South Korea, documents, technology, PowerPoint, expertise, authority 
 
Assistant Manager So-yeon leaned over to my desk and doodled a cartoon pig in my field 
notebook. She was covertly depicting her direct boss, Team Manager Park, seated a few desks 
away and unaware of the silent slight. So-yeon, normally in charge of employee training at the 
6DQJGR*URXSZDVDWWKHWLPHODERULQJRYHUWKH³+5'HYHORSPHQW7HDP$QQXDO3ODQ´
The document, drafted entirely in PowerPoint, had been requested by So-\HRQ¶VDQG7HDP
0DQDJHU3DUN¶VERVV([HFXWLYH&KR7HDP0Dnager Park oversaw So-\HRQ¶VZRUNRQWKHVOLGHV
and it was he who delivered them to Executive Cho for review. Cho, however, kept demanding 
revisions from Park who in turn passed along the demands to So-yeon and a teammate. Over a 
period of a few weeks, the team of three reworked the document after hours, over the weekend, 
DQGRQFHHYHQDOOQLJKWWRPHHW&KR¶VH[DFWLQJEXWVKLIWLQJVSHFLILFDWLRQV)HOORZPHPEHUVRI
the Human Resources team looked on with dismay and concern for their co-ZRUNHUV¶KHDOWK, and 
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with some derision over the fuss paid to an internal document. After two weeks and no final 
approval on how the document should be structured and written, Executive Cho halted the 
production on a document he himself had ordered. 
In South Korea (henceforth Korea), Microsoft¶VPowerPoint software has become deeply 
integrated into white-collar office worlds. The digital slide-share program, originally developed 
in the United States in 1987 as a replacement for overhead slides, has enjoyed widespread 
dissemination in its brief history. More than just technological diffusion around the world, 
PowerPoint has become enregistered as ± that is, become taken as a way to convey ± a legitimate 
mode of office documentation and global practice. Diverse office functions like human 
resources, strategy, marketing, production management, sales, and others use PowerPoint and its 
recognizable genres to embed work, spanning numerous institutional contexts: business offices, 
government offices, schools, universities, and even militaries (Yates and Orlikowski 2007; 
Galloway 2011; Kaplan 2011; Robles-Anderson and Svensson 2016). In Korea, where 
PowerPoint has been sold since the early 1990s, using 0LFURVRIW¶VPowerPoint over another 
modality, such as the Korean software Hangul Office, can VLJQDODQRIILFH¶VLQWHJUDWLRQwith 
global documentation norms. At the same time, PowerPoint has also become enregistered as a 
way to shape the subjects of those who use it: analysts, consultants, and potential recruits draw, 
and draw on, PowerPoint to mediate their working selves, often in the capacity as knowledgeable 
experts (Knoblauch 2008, 2012). (Even the current President of Korea, Moon Jae-in, used a 
simulcast PowerPoint presentation in a 2017 speech in front of the National Assembly.) In 
.RUHDWRH[FHODW3RZHU3RLQWFDQHDUQRQHWKHODEHO³JRGRISUHVHQWLQJ´balpyo-ui sin),i a 
moniker conveying DSHUVRQ¶Vseemingly effortless coordination of oral and visual charisma and 
knack for earning favorable evaluations from audiences and readers.ii  
  3 
Despite the widespread enregisterment of these two orders ± to document organizational 
knowledge anonymously and to display the individual skills of its users ± the practicalities of 
document production inside organizations, mediated as such by multiple stages of production, 
complex managerial hierarchies,iii and anonymously written documents, frequently muddle the 
empirical separability of these two orders. Nevertheless, their ideological persistence remains a 
constant source of tension, one that repeatedly converges in the context of PowerPoint 
documents: So-yeon and her team confronted the challenge of creating a plan that would satisfy 
the demands of internal knowledge standards, but also one that would make them look good as a 
team. In the end, they created a plan that appeared to satisfy neither. This article tackles how 
institutional and individual authorities converge and intersect over a document technology that 
seems to frequently fail at delineating both. I aim to show that such failures are not an under-
attunement of a global technology to cultural or social contexts, but rather an over-attunement by 
office workers to the complex politics now mediated by PowerPoint.  
Anthropologists have provided different accounts for why institutional documentation 
projects appear to fail ± the role of materiality (M. Hull 2012), the necessity of reaching 
consensus (Riles 1998), problems of translation and legibility (Jacob 2007), and paradoxes 
within ideologies themselves (E. Hull 2012). We have also highlighted how soul-less 
bureaucratic processes must be re-animated by the charisma of culture and sociality to make 
them inhabitable (Göpfert 2013; Nading 2016). This article confronts a group of actors ± white-
collar Korean corporate office workers ± who broadly share the same views about the importance 
of formal documentation to organizational functioning, the importance of individual recognition 
at work, and the role of digital technologies for mediating these efforts ± that is, who have no 
qualms about office work or documentation. This article suggests that these institutional actors 
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disagree about how this authority should be translated into documentary styles and whose style 
counts. The ethnographic problem I highlight for Korean office workers is not whether a 
technology like PowerPoint has corrupted existing office literacies or made work soulless; rather, 
it is how to succeed within a bottleneck where multiple powers converge in the narrow channel 
of the PowerPoint slide. To succeed requires reading and interpreting the minds and feelings of 
those who have institutional authority over the control of documents. It entails learning how to 
translate those into a textual-visual format where colors, charts, arrangements, wordings, 
sequencings, and visual arrangements are crucial. For some, lengthy and detailed PowerPoints 
are appropriate, while for others short and colorful will suffice. Navigating the politics of the 
Korean office means learning to properly embed the authorities of others DQGPDNLQJRQH¶V
contribution known in subtle ways. :KLOHDJUHHLQJLQSULQFLSOHZLWK3DUN	%XFKROW]¶VQRWLRQ
WKDW³WKHSURFHVVRIHQWH[WXDOL]DWLRQLVHVVHQWLDOIRUWKHUHSURGXFWLRQRILQVWLWXWLRQDODXWKRULW\´
(2009: 487) and that texts give shape to modern organizations (Harper 1998), this article 
suggests that even as PowerPoint has become enregistered as an authoritative medium for much 
office work, and even as certain genres, like plans, reports, and proposals, have become 
conventionalized in PowerPoint, the production of any individual document is a social event of 
heightened importance, not only for what it says, but what it says about those involved in making 
it.  
By focusing on the convergence of institutional ideologies for documentation and 
individuation at the level of PowerPoint making, this article poses questions for how 
anthropologists frame conflicts of individuality and institutionality more generally. Institutional 
will and individual freedom are commonly understood to be separate and inherently in conflict 
(Fleming 2013), where institutions like bureaucracies or corporations act like persons that 
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reproduce themselves in particular ways (Best 2012). However, modern organizational workers 
associate their selves with institutions along gradient degrees of authority and belonging and are 
regularly involved in the production of institutional knowledge that also implicates themselves. 
In contemporary Korea, organization-internal conflicts are not about institutions against 
individuals, but institutions as particular individuals, such as chairmen (hoejang) who appear to 
have psychic control over their employees, executives whose decisions can sway the stress levels 
of hundreds below, or individual team managers who may coercively or normatively control the 
social lives of team members.iv Pig-drawing So-yeon was not complaining about corporate 
culture as an abstract force over her life, but rather Team Manager Park and ([HFXWLYH&KR¶V
mis-interpretations of what degree of textual refinement was necessary ± and what sacrifices 
could be demanded ± for an internal document. Part of the problem, then, has been a dual 
attention to salient signs of institutionality ± anonymity, objectivity, textuality ± and salient signs 
of individuality ± style, voice, creativity ± as inherently distinct forces. While attention has been 
paid to how individual style animates bureaucratic documents (e.g., Göpfert [2013]), less focus 
has been paid to the ways that  not the ways that institutional-internal documents are themselves 
³FUDIWHG,´WRXVH1DGLQJ¶VSKUDVH. 
This article draws on ethnographic fieldwork in Korea where I worked as an intern-slash-
researcher at the Sangdo Holdings company (pseudonym), the headquarters of the Sangdo 
Group, a multi-national Korean steel conglomerate, between 2014 and 2015, in addition to 
interviews and media analysis in the Korean corporate world. I argue two main points: first, that 
institutional authorities emerge around the participatory affordances of document-crafting, not 
the authority of texts as singular objects nor detached performances, and second, that a key mode 
of grounding authorities in texts is successfully embedding the tastes of others in them ± that is, 
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by making individual styles appear as institutional productions. Focusing on the participatory 
stages of document-crafting reveals how fractions of authority emerge across different roles, 
from drafters who demonstrate their creativity on the slide, to managers who exercise their 
ability to scrutinize documents, and to executives who demonstrate their vision by 
commissioning documents in the first place. Such a focus aims to demonstrate not that idealized 
formal orders comes into conflict with the realities of social context, but that institutional actors 
have to regularly embed office politics into their slides. 
Corporate Korea provides a fruitful domain for exploring this phenomenon because of the 
general pattern of stratified managerial hierarchies as well as social conventions for enacting the 
authority of others through a register of honorification, deference, and respect. In the office, this 
is reflected in how employees tailor document styles, contents, and delivery to the tastes or 
concerns of superiors, creating an economy for awareness of and concern for others. In contrast 
to an American PowerPoint software that was originally developed to streamline the division of 
labor between idea-makers and visual-creators, reanimating the liberal, creative subject (see 
Gaskins [2012]), Korean employees and teams overelaborate these divisions, by repeatedly 
editing, checking, and approving PowerPoints documents. Western critics have depicted the 
PowerPoint slide as lacking in rhetorical, aesthetic, or even moral value as it lulls contemporary 
office workers to sleep or corrupts their moralities (Parker 2001, Tufte 2006). In Korea, 
PowerPoint is a site of intense social focus, where multiple powers converge ± the powers above, 
WKHSRZHUWRGHPRQVWUDWHRQH¶VVNLOOWKHSRZHURIwork as a status-marker ± bringing heightened 
attention to what documents say and, more importantly, what they say about their writers, 
readers, and handlers. Such attention to others over seemingly non-productive work is reflected 
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in global labor statistics: Korean workers spend world-leading time at work (OECD 2018) but 
DUHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\GXEEHGZLWKKDYLQJSHUHQQLDO³ORZSURGXFWLYLW\´v 
In what follows, I first describe how enactments of RWKHUV¶authority is not just a cultural 
convention but a key way of navigating complex labor organizations in the face of obscure job 
prospects within white-collar environments. I then describe the skill that employees develop as 
they move along office hierarchies is not one of greater technical skill at writing PowerPoints, 
but of reading and interpreting others, skills narrated by employees and marketed in self-help 
guides. I then turn to the ways that managers and executives find their own expertise inhibited by 
the PowerPoint habits of others. Lastly, I describe three cases of actors who attempt to navigate 
their way out of the PowerPoint economy, with some attempting to get rid of PowerPoint all 
together. 
 
 
KOREAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE AUTHORITY OF OTHERS 
 
Large industrial conglomerates, such as the Samsung Group or POSCO Group, have been 
relatively stable figures on the Korean economic landscape since the 1970s (Kim and Park 
2011). Their internal dynamics are anything but stable, however: pyramid-like organizations 
annually hire and promote large cohorts of new members who are evaluated, promoted, or 
filtered out over the course of their careers. Even for prestige ³UHJXODUZRUNHUV´jeong-gyu jik), 
who have passed entry exams and receive higher salaries and benefits, internal labor markets 
remain competitive, with annual performance evaluations and formal tests for rank-promotion 
every four or five years. Long-term employees may reach high-salaried managerial positions in 
their mid- to late-careers, and in exceptional circumstances, achieve executive positions, yet the 
prospects of lifetime employment at a single company exist for only a select few. Even for 
  8 
owners of family-owned conglomerates (so-called chaebol), though not following the same 
career paths as the general workforce, succession can be competitive and subject to intense 
scrutiny. Claims over the rightful seats of ownership frequently lead to bitter internecine battles 
and company spin-offs.vi Though corporations have a legal existence separate from their 
employees and owners, the issue of who can rightfully be employed at and represent corporate 
organizations remains an ongoing concern at all levels. 
In theory, the operation of companies and the evaluation of members should follow two 
different processes: the creation of anonymous, depersonalized corporate knowledge on one 
KDQGDQGWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIPHPEHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVRQWKHRWKHU7KLVVHSDUDWLRQKDVEHFRPH
LGHRORJLFDOO\PRUHVDOLHQWLQWKHDGYHQWRIWKH³SHUIRUPDQFHHUD´seong-gwajui sidae), in which 
promotions aimed to be judged by RQH¶Vmerit and performance, not pure seniority. A range of 
new HR techniques emerged since the early 2000s which sought to affix objective performance 
evaluations onto individual work, such as through letter grades, metrics, or other indices 
including ³Key Performance Indicators´ (KPIs), disentangling individual performance from 
work so it could be properly evaluated (cf. Chumley 2013). These are technocratic attempts to 
separate what we might classify as the first-order of labor (work itself) from its second-order 
inferences (DZRUNHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ).vii 
7KHVHWZRRUGHUVFDQQHYHUEHFRPSOHWHO\³SXULILHG´IURPHDFKRWKHU, however. Even 
scrubbed of authorship, documents bear indexical traces of those who ordered them, those who 
worked on them, and those who last touched them. Individual performance metrics, too, such as 
annual performance grades, are filled out, decided, and approved by individual managers and 
executives. Managers and executives themselves are also evaluated on abstract criteria, such as 
leadership qualities, team morale, or team effectiveness that link their own individual work to the 
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performance of a group. While certain sites, such as the after-work drinking event (hoesik), 
occupy an ideologically salient position in imagining Korean organizational politics away from 
the formal, first-order level of work, everyday activities like drafting documents are potent sites 
for encountering tensions over the individual and the institutional. 
If in Western contexts, second-order inferences of labor are linked to qualities of the self 
(such as ego-grounding performances), Korean norms of authority are premised on 
acknowledging RWKHUV¶authority: the authority of a chairman, executive, manager, and so on, is 
enacted by his or her subordinates. In the context of the office, these norms are captured in the 
term nunchi bogi RU³JODQFH-ZDWFKLQJ´1XQFKLERJL refers to the skill one has at observing the 
mood of a situation, a group, or a superior, and anticipating the situationally appropriate thing to 
do, usually accommodating the tastes or needs of a superior. Properly demonstrating nunchi 
involves seamlessly carrying out a necessary action without making its necessity visible. The 
DUFKHW\SLFDOH[DPSOHLQYROYHVQRWOHDYLQJZRUNXQWLODIWHURQH¶VERVVKDVDOVROHIWZKLOH
claiming to do (unnecessary) work.viii To do nunchi properly is WRPDNHRQH¶VVHOIORRNJRRGE\
possessing both concern for RWKHUVDQGVRFLDOJUDFHVWRQRWGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQ
Conversely, to accuse someone of not having nunchi brings attention to the fault of others for 
failing to provide respect to a higher authority or being oblivious to a social mood. Workers who 
go home at the official quitting time are said to not possess nunchi, for instance. Nunchi 
represents a gradated skill that one can be more or less adept at, especially as the situations 
become more interactionally complex or unexpected. Greater degrees of nunchi can be 
demonstrated in activities that seem not to call for it at all, such as anticipating what a boss might 
want for lunch on a Thursday or knowing how he or she prefers images to be arranged on a slide. 
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In this context of both organizational hierarchies and collective production, a complex 
politics unfolds. A scene in the Korean crime movie The Outlaws (2017) illustrates this well. A 
police sergeant chides a rookie cop over a report the rookie wrote and submitted directly to the 
VHUJHDQW¶VERVV7KHUHSRUWZKLFKGHWDLOHGWKHHYHQWVRIDFULPHVFHQHQRWHGWKDWWKHVHUJHDQW
came to the crime scene straight from a golf course. This detail was factually ³FRUUHFW´EXW
QRUPDWLYHO\³ZURQJ´LWreflected poorly on the sergeant in the eyes of his superior. It also 
UHIOHFWHGWKDWWKHURRNLHKDGQRWEHHQSURSHUO\VRFLDOL]HGRQKRZWR³ZULWH´DSROLFHUHSRUW; he 
should have learned to leave out facts that might implicate his boss referentially. Green-eared 
employees may receive scoldings from mid-level employees, but mid-level employees are also 
beholden to the ways their junior employees write about them. Just as Executive Cho could 
command So-yeon and her teammates below in the Sangdo HR department, he himself was 
captured by how they wrote their slides. As one moves up in a Korean organizational hierarchy, 
the production of writing becomes inversely proportional to rank: lower-level employees are 
more responsible for writing content but are less responsible for its commitments; higher-level 
managers can be directly responsible for the commitments of a document but may not be 
involved at all in its production. These generate ³PRUDOPDzes´(Jackall 2010) in the office which 
unfold around shared work and divided responsibilities, made more complicated by their 
condensation around the largely singular textual medium and neutral office register of 
PowerPoint documents. 
The creation of institutional documents ± the entextualization process ± is an often 
overlooked interactional and bureaucratic achievement: many documents like So-\HRQ¶Vannual 
plan are never completed or undergo multiple rounds of seemingly useless edits from the point of 
view of first-order content. Bosses may intercede to make sure nothing bad reflects on them or 
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that documents are properly tailored to those above. In an online survey of office workers (see 
footnote seven, above), respondents noted that they were most on edge around bosses who 
³ZDWFKWKHLURZQERVVHVDQGFKDQJHWKHLUPLQGVIUHTXHQWO\´DQG³DUHSHUIHFWLRQLVWVDERXWHYHQ
VPDOOGHWDLOV´The perceived malfunctioning of the office at the level of textual content is 
arguably its proper functioning at a higher-order of other-oriented authority. 
Even as the Korean labor market has increasingly selected for iconic representations of 
neoliberal subjects to get into companies (see Abelmann et al., 2009; Park 2010), once in an 
office, employees become concerned with how to link themselves with successful superiors, 
teams, or divisions. New employees worry about how to grab D³OLQH´jul or ra-in) with bosses 
who have the hot hand and mid-level employees worry about how to remain on them. Lines can 
be made or unmade in practice, as individuals mark indexical traces of document production, 
from dedicating (over)time on a document, to hand-delivering a printed file to a superior, to 
simply chipping in on slide creation. These acts leave no trace to individuals in the final 
entextualized document but serve as covert ³signs of recognition´ (Keane 1997) if performed 
successfully. Such acts of attention underlie the more complex process and skill needed to pick 
up on VXSHULRUV¶documentary tastes. 
 
 
DOCUMENTARY TASTES $1'³&$7&+,1*´$67</( 
 
In Figure 1 below, a cartoon from the Korean newspaper Hankyung depicts two 
employees divided over what constitutes a proper ³UHSRUW´bogoseo). The narrative 
accompanying the cartoon tells the story of the assistant manager, on the right, who was scolded 
for his style of report writing. He encountered problems because: 
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he didn¶WIROORZ&RPSDQ\$¶VVHWUXOHVIRUUHSRUWVfont: Batang, font size: 13, line 
spacing: 160%, color: grayscale, and so on. He thought that if he made the report so that 
one could understand the contents, that would be okay, but he got culture shock at these 
so-called ³UHJXODWLRQV´ 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
The assistant manager associates a report with its content in mind, but he did not heed the 
FRPSDQ\¶VUHJXODWLRQVIRUGRFXPHQWGUDIWLQJ7KHFDUWRRQLPSOLHVWKDWUXOHVDUHDUELWUDU\DQG
outdated ± associated with older forms of formal drafting, not modern PowerPoint ± and merely 
a matter of the personal discretion of the older manager to enforce them. In this sense, the 
DVVLVWDQWPDQDJHUPXVWQRZOHDUQWRDGDSWWRWKH³FRPSDQ\¶V´VW\OHEXWKHPXVWDOVROHDUQWKDW
this is how this boss prefers documents. Later in the account, the assistant manager was reported 
to coerce other co-workers to check over his PowerPoint reports prior to delivering them to the 
fickle manager.  
The cartoon paints a clear picture of two office types, recognizable by subtle identity 
cues. The clash between an emotionally volatile, company-loyal older manager and the young, 
globally-oriented, ideas-based younger manager instantiates a productive generational trope in 
the Korean office: old versus new, rules versus creativity, senior versus junior (Prentice, n.d.). 
This clash is precipitated and mediated by decisions around competing tastes: those that adhere 
to company ³rules´YHUVXVWKRVHWKDWKDYHPHULWWKURXJKWKHLURZQ³FRQWHQW´7KHimplication is 
that such a generational mis-calibration between juniors and seniors is blocking the success of 
Korean companies and a key source of office headaches. 
In actual offices, conflicts do not happen across such recognizable sociological figures 
and binary encounters; rather, employees attune to the particular personalities and tastes of their 
managers to create and deliver documents, requiring extensive work to both grasp and make 
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manifest in a given document. Companies like Sangdo have their own internal rules (sanae 
gyujeong) that specify pro-forma rules about document formatting (such as font sizes, line 
spacing, and margins), but such rules can hardly cover the aesthetic and genre variations potent 
in any possible PowerPoint document. Moreover, the indexed qualities of such documents 
(timing, materiality, presentation) is rarely elevated to the level of official commentary. 
Employees regularly attune to this information, however, as they are socialized in the office. 
During my fieldwork at Sangdo Holdings, Executive Cho asked me to write a report for him 
about HR strategies during mergers and acquisitions (M&A). I asked Assistant Manager Ji-soon, 
So-\HRQ¶VWHDPPDWH who was known for making organized and aesthetically clean PowerPoint 
documents, for advice. She sent me the following email: 
 
Excerpt 1: Email from Ji-soon 
Hello,  
I am forwarding you a template example for use with reporting to Executive Cho. 
A story that is logical, contents that are structured, and a conclusion that is clear 
(as a tool for making decisions) is a report of this style. Please refer to the 
structure!  
 
Thank you. 
 
 
Attached to her email was a Sangdo PowerPoint template that had guidelines on the appropriate 
use of arrows, font sizes, colors, and some basic slide layouts that she herself had made for 
members of the HR team. More than the aesthetics of the template, the important point was to 
understand that good documents had a logical and decision-oriented structure to them, and that 
these qualities were specifically linked to Executive Cho¶VWDVWe. Thinking I understood this 
principle, I worked for two weeks trying to make a report that properly summarized HR 
principles and strategies during an M&A. A subsequent one-on-one meeting with Executive Cho 
to discuss a draft of the report lasted one hour and he did not move past the second slide I had 
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made, repeatedly pointing out the illogical nature of my proposed argument and illegibility of my 
diagrams. He did not give any new suggestions for how to re-design it, however. I worked on it 
for another week on my own. Seeing I was struggling, Team Manager Jang, Ji-VRRQ¶VERVVWROG
me to just stop working on it, because, despite the apparent gravity of the topic, it was just a pet 
project of ExecuWLYH&KR¶VThat is, it did not matter to the functioning of the company or their 
team. And indeed, I stopped working on it and no one ever brought it up again. I later found out 
that while everyone else on the team understood the principle of logical thinking in the abstract, 
no one knew how to translate such principles into documents that would please Executive Cho 
on the first draft.ix Lengthy scoldings were an uncomfortable ritual within the team. At certain 
cynical moments of uncertainty, my co-workers scoffed that Executive Cho himself did not 
know what he wanted. 
)RUPRUHH[SHULHQFHGHPSOR\HHVDWWXQLQJWRDVXSHULRU¶VVW\OHRUKDELWVLVDEDVLFIDFHW
of work and a skill developed quasi-ethnographically. Below is an excerpt from an interview I 
conducted with a Manager Song who worked at a company where his higher-up bosses rotated 
IUHTXHQWO\+HGHVFULEHVKRZKH³FDWFKHV´DQHZERVV¶VVW\OH 
 
Excerpt 2: Interview with Manager Song 
(Discussing production of PowerPoint) 
In our case, generally you have to catch [kaetchi] the style of your direct boss quickly and 
WKHQPDWFK\RXUVW\OHZKHQ\RXZULWHVRPHWKLQJ,W¶VMXVWPRUHFRQYHQLHQW/LNHLI
someone starts to work in your department and you need to get a decision [from him], 
within one month I need to catch how he looks at reports or what style he likes and then I 
PDWFKLW7KDW¶VKRZ\RXGRLW 
 
(Asked about standardized files) 
There are standardized files on the company intranet, but there are some subtle 
differences about what [bosses] want. Some people like graphs. As for colors, some 
people like [reports to be] more colorful. Some people like pictures or models. If I match 
LWLW¶VHDVLHUIRUPHWRR,I,GRQ¶WPDWFKLWWKHQWKH\DOZD\VPDNH\RXUHGRLW 
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At a practical level, grasping the taste of DERVVLVQRWMXVWDERXWVKRZLQJRIIRQH¶VRZQVNLOOEXW
about getting a decision or approval on a document, often so it can be passed along to a higher 
authority for further approval or review. In this sense, arranging information into a complex text 
with clear arguments, evidence, visual layout and readability is a task of anticipatory refinement. 
In a system of nested ranks like a managerial hierarchy, these acts of refinement continue along 
the chain of entextualization.x A high-ranking executive at Sangdo told me that he himself had 
developed his own style of presenting documents to the chairman over the course of his career: 
he made sure to present three clearly distinct options on a slide from which the chairman could 
choose (he often had a secretarial worker draft the slides for him, to boot). He anticipated a 
desired interactional position for the chairman, allowing him to make an informed, but 
simplified, decision without presenting too much or too little information. 
There are numerous self-help books in Korea on how to properly make and design 
PowerPoint reports and presentations, with many of them focused on basics of designing slides 
and sequencing arguments, with titles like God of Reporting, The Report-writing Guidebook, The 
Plan Master, The Right Way to Write a Proposal, as well as many others on navigating corporate 
politics in general, such as Forty-one Tactics to Survive the Office and Fifty Techniques Middle-
managers Should Know. The books often over-dramatize the stakes of individual documents, 
such as one that declares, ³WKHPRPHQWRIUHSRUWLQJFDQGHFLGH\RXUIDWH´Nevertheless, the 
books advocate that success in submitting documents comes from developing both attunement to 
the needs of superiors and development of contextual cues LQGLFDWHRQH¶VRZQFRQWULEXWLRQ. In 
the case of the former, the book Seven Principles of Reporting describes a difference between 
two kinds of narrative arcs in documents: dugwalsik or ³KHDG-RULHQWHGVW\OH´LQZKLFKWKHPDLQ
point or arguments come at the beginning of a PowerPoint, and migwalsik RU³WDLO-RULHQWHGVW\OH´
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in which the main arguments come at the end after a long, evidence-based build-up. The book 
argues that it is best to adopt a head-oriented style, for two reasons: one, so that the busy reader, 
VXFKDVRQH¶VERVVFDQERWKVHHYLVXDOO\DQGJHWWRVHTXHQWLDOO\WKHSRLQWTXLFNO\DQGHDVLO\
it also VKRZVRIIRQH¶VPDLQFRQWULEXWLRQPRUHUHDGLO\,QWKHFDVHRIcontextual cues, a book 
titled Secret Weapons that Work at Work suggests that employees attune to the moments around 
UHSRUWLQJSDUWLFXODUO\WRWKHQHHGVRIRQH¶VGLUHFWERVV 
 
([FHUSW.H\³SRLQWV´IRUGLVFRYHULQJVHFUHWZHDSRQVDWZRUN 
 
³)LQGRXWDQGUHSRUWRQZKDWLVWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWWKHRWKHUSHUVRQERVVQHHGV´ 
 
³0DNHUHSRUWVSULPDULO\EDVHGRQZKDWWKHERVVLVLQWHUHVWHGLQ´ 
 
³7REHFRPHDWDOHQWHGSHUVRQZKR¶VJRRGDWZRUNWKHDUWRIOLVWHQLQJLVFUXFLDO´ 
 
³5HSRUWVVKRXOGEHMXVWOLNHDORRSDOZD\VFUHDWLQJDFRQQHFWLRQWRWKHQH[WWKLQJ´ 
 
³,QDQµAOOWKDQNVWRP\PDQDJHU«¶VW\OHGHIWO\ORZHU\RXUVHOIDQGKXPEO\
FRPPXQLFDWHWR\RXUERVV´ 
 
 
Secret Weapons notes that employees should attune to features of language from bosses that are 
QRWHYHQVSRNHQ³DQRUGHUWKDWLVQ¶WDQRUGHULVVWLOODQRUGHU´$QLQIRUPDQWZKRZDVDPLG-
level manager at another company described this practice as finding the bonsim or ³WUXHIHHOLQJV´
(Sino-Korean: 㲨㥾) of higher-ups. Bonsim goes beyond acts of speaking or even actual 
thoughts, indicating what someone can truly feel inside. This process of interactional anticipation 
and mind-reading is captured in the diagram in Figure 2 below, from the book God of Reporting. 
The neo-Saussurian diagram depicts not the exchange of communication, but the exchange of 
thoughts: the diagram recommends an alignment between the requested topic and the response 
WKHGRFXPHQWLWVHOIDVZHOODVWKH³ZULWLQJSHUVRQ´DQGWKH³UHDGLQJSHUVRQ´:ULWHUVVKRXOG
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³JUDVS´pa-akWKHSUREOHPZKLOHPDNLQJVXUHWKHUHTXHVWDQGWKHGRFXPHQW³DFWDVRQH´ilchi). 
7KHJHQHUDOL]HGLQWHUDFWLRQDOUROHFDWHJRULHV³ZULWLQJSHUVRQ´DQG³UHDGLQJSHUVRQ´UHIOHFWKRZ
this general dyadic relationship can be imagined across different ranks, authorities, and 
document genres.  
[Figure 2] 
 
To the degree that Korean office workers attune so well to norms of other-orientation and their 
interactional and material translations, why would documents ever get stopped up or fail? 
2UGHULQJUHSRUWVRUPDNLQJUHYLVLRQVLVDOVRDPHDQVRIGHPRQVWUDWLQJRQH¶VDXWKRULW\7REHD
superior who does not evaluate, edit, or correct at all, is to be a superior with no authority. In the 
FDUWRRQLQ)LJXUHWKHUHFRXUVHWR³FRPSDQ\UHJXODWLRQV´UHSUHVHQWHGWKHODVWEDVWLRQRI
authority for an older manager outsmarted by a younger generation. Opportunities for 
REVWUXFWLRQFDQWDNHSODFHRYHUGLIIHUHQWPRPHQWVWKHUHLVDVWHUHRW\SHRI³UHGSHQ´bbalggan 
pen) managers who mark-up documents excessively, akin to school teachers correcting their 
VWXGHQWV7KHUHDUHPDQDJHUVZKRDUHNQRZQIRUEHLQJ³IDVWLGLRXV´ggomggomhan) in re-
checking figures and numbers and  second-guessing their own employees. And there are mangers 
ZKRFDQKROG³PDUDWKRQPHHWLQJV´maraton hoe-ui) to review documents at length. The 
performative necessity of such authoritative intermediation is not insignificant. To approve 
everything and review nothing reveals that one has no authority at all. A colleague at Sangdo 
recounted a story of a team manager who had been FXWRXWRIKLVWHDP¶VGRFXPHQWdrafting 
process. A junior manager simply gave his documents directly to the executive above, skipping 
over his team manager. The junior manager avoided accusations of subversion by saying he 
ZDQWHGWRUHVSHFWWKHWHDPPDQDJHU¶VWLPH7KHWHDPPDQDJHUXQGHUVWRRGthis lack of work as a 
sign that he had been shunned. The writing was on the wall, and he later resigned.xi 
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Anthropological accounts of the aestheticization of documents have often focused on 
what they say about their writers, in line with accounts of style more generally (cf. Irvine 2001). 
Göpfert (2013) QRWHVIRULQVWDQFHWKDWLQ1LJHU³JHQGDUPHV>PLOLWDU\SROLFH@ZDQWWRSURYHWR
themselves, their colleagues, and their superiors that they can carry the reputation and the self-
LPDJHRIZULWLQJLQWHOOHFWXDOV´ (330) in the artful drafting of police reports. In corporate Korea, 
RQH¶VRULHQWDWLRQWRWKHWDVWHVSHUVRQDOLWLHVDQGHYHQIXWXUHfeeling states of superiors in the 
drafting of seemingly neutral documents like plans, reports, and proposals, reveals much in turn 
about RQH¶VRZQsocial skills. The overlaying of personal qualities onto conventional textual 
qualities also brings them into alignment with superficially institutional goals, shielding the 
personal politics and interests behind any given document.  
 
 
MANAGERS IN MEDIAS RES 
  
For managers or executives in large organizations, to be at the receiving end of such 
documents is a mark of institutional authority, but it also entails being at the whims of those 
below and being constrained in the types of actions available to take. For instance, M. Hull 
(2012: 160) describes how a low-level functionary in Pakistan tricked a higher-level bureaucrat 
into signing documents that he had not read carefully. In this section, I focus on how a team of 
high-level managers at Sangdo found their own authority paradoxically constrained in a process 
they were in charge of.  
A hallway down from Human Resources, the Performance Management Team of Sangdo 
+ROGLQJVRYHUVDZSURGXFWLYLW\DQGVDOHVDFURVVWKHJURXS¶VVXEVLGLDULHV7KLVRYHUVLJKWZDV
PHGLDWHGE\D³PRQWKO\PDQDJHPHQWUHSRUW´wolgan gyeong-yeong bogoseo) that each Sangdo 
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company was responsible for submitting up to the chairman and ownership. When I shadowed 
the team in 2015, three assistant members, a team manager, and a new executive were revamping 
the monthly reporting process. At issue for the team was how to create a PowerPoint template 
that subsidiaries could produce within a narrow time frame and limited textual space that could 
also accurately summarize their key events each month, such as sales, new clients, or key 
indicators in their supply lines. To be legible for the chairman, each report was meant to be three 
to five PowerPoint slides long. The Performance Management Team would also have to submit 
the document quickly after the end of each month, lest the reports and the information become 
³WUDVK´sseuregi), in the words of one team member.  
I participated in a pair of lengthy team meetings organized by the team executive to 
discuss the new report template. This was more than simply capturing first-order information 
about manufacturing and sales activities. In the meetings, the team attempted to align the 
FKDLUPDQ¶VDQWLFLSDWHG³QHHGV´nijeu) with the format of the template itself. Because they did 
not know exactly what the chairman would need, they debated how to translate different pieces 
of information into the textual specifics of a PowerPoint report template (the meeting itself was 
also organized in PowerPoint). A key issue was how to translate SLHFHVRIRWKHUV¶H[SHUWLVHLQWR
WKHLURZQ³HSLVWHPLFMXULVGLFWLRQ´(Boyer 2008). One of their discussions centered on what 
³UDWLR´RITXDQWLWDWLYH DQGTXDOLWDWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQVKRXOGEHLQWKHUHSRUWVXFKDV³´
³´RU³´4XDQWLWDWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQOLNHVDOHVLQIRUPDWLRQZDVXVHIXODQGHDV\WR
assemble directly from subsidiaries, but it would not provide any interpretation over what the 
data meant. Qualitative information, like analyses of market trends or explanatory remarks about 
increases or decreases in sales, would be more beneficial to interpreting the data; it would also 
GHPRQVWUDWHWKHWHDP¶VRZQH[SHUWLVH4XDOLWDWLYH-heavy reports, however, came with risks: they 
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would require subjective interpretation, more information gathering, and a longer production 
time to analyze data and make consistently useful insights. One manager voiced concern about 
the commitments they might be unwittingly signing up for: what if they merely gave the same 
insights every month? Thus, they were not concerned only about the relation between the 
primary source data and its synechdochal summary to the chairman (that is, what or how it was 
represented); they were also concerned with the second-order readings about how their own 
labor and expertise would be read as well.  
Doing a more ³value-added´approach (with more qualitative data to allow interpretation 
of the quantitative data) would take longer, meaning the chairman and other owners might not 
see the reports until the twelfth day of each month. The executive believed this would make the 
reports useless as it would be too late to make use of the information on a month-by-month basis. 
Asking subsidiaries to submit the information in a shorter period, such as at a fixed date each 
month, might risk employees having to work on weekends or holidays to meet deadlines. This 
fact seemed particularly salient to the younger managers who deemed it unfair to make others 
work over holidays. The executive had less sympathy. He considered excuses for being late, 
including national holidays, suspicious. He harbored some skepticism towards the subsidiaries 
DQGWKHLUPRWLYDWLRQVFDOOLQJWKHPDWRQHSRLQW³URWWHQH[FXVH-mDNHUV´birin naemse naneun 
bbenjjiri), suggesting they were trying to hide poor results from the chairman by delaying the 
reports.  
In one of the meetings, the executive emphasized to the team the importance of the 
physical act of delivering the report to the chairman. If the executive were to deliver the numbers 
with no analysis but on time, then there would be no value for their team; they would be merely 
conduits. As figurative extensions of the chairman, however, they should come up with some 
  21 
analysis to include in the report, to demonstrate their expertise and validate their own positions. 
As they debated what kinds of qualitative information to include, one joked that including too 
much information would resemble a school textbook. Thick reports, however, were the 
preferences of one of the members of the ownership team below the chairman, another chimed 
LQ(YHQLILWH[FHHGHGWKHFKDLUPDQ¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVIRUVKRUWHUUHSRUWVLWPLJKWEHEHWWHUWR
covertly address it to the other RZQHU¶VWDVWHVHYHQWKough he was not the official addressee. The 
other owner, they reasoned, was the one who made the real decisions. 
The Performance Management team found itself in an organizational logjam. Their very 
position was premised on collating and submitting a report that could visually condense 
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWVXEVLGLDU\SHUIRUPDQFHIRUWKHFKDLUPDQ¶VH\HV7KLVlogjam was felt both 
text-internally, in terms of what content to include, and text-externally, in terms of deadlines, 
turn-around times, and modes of delivery. That disagreement arose within the team is not 
surprising: the executive, who reported directly to the chairman, was adamant that the 
Performance Management Team make its expert impact known, lest they (or he) be seen as non-
experts. For the junior members, they faced a nested risk within their own team: the burden of 
producing insights was up to them. They would be responsible for tracking down subsidiaries 
who submitted documents late or incorrectly, tracking market trends, and interpreting 
quantitative data ± and likely working on the weekends. The potential for failure on their part 
might bring into doubt their own suitability within their team. 
Why could the team not ask the chairman what he wanted or ask the subsidiaries what 
was reasonable? It was the job of the Performance Management Team to attune to this as a 
condition of their expertise, purportedly the highest in the whole group. It was also a condition of 
their expertise to institute discipline and order onto the subsidiaries whose performance results 
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were viewed skeptically by those above. Monthly management reporting was not just a way of 
gathering information, but the process itself was a form of documentary discipline whose levers 
could be adjusted to increase control at the headquarters (in much the same way that Wall Street 
exercises control over publicly traded corporations by demanding frequent and extensive 
quarterly reports)<HWLQ6DQJGR¶VFDVHLWZDVWKHHOLWHWHDPLWVHOIWKDWEHFDPHFRQVXPHGE\WKH
creation of such a template and its production, engaging in marathon meetings discussing the 
details of a PowerPoint template and debating what kinds of documentary commitments they 
would be crafting for themselves. 
 
 
MITIGATING THE POWERS IN POWERPOINT 
 
Not all office workers commit to the traps of working over PowerPoint documents to 
appease others. Some even revolt against it. In this section, I look at three different institutional 
responses for mitigating the powers in PowerPoint. 
Across from Team Manager Park (So-\HRQ¶VERVV was Team Manager Jang (Ji-VRRQ¶V
boss). The two team managers oversaw different HR functions and both formally reported to 
Executive Cho. Both had followed similar educational and career paths to come to Sangdo 
Holdings. Where Park had worked as a consultant in a US-linked consulting firm, Jang had 
worked in HR management at a large Korean manufacturing company for his entire career. Their 
career trajectories shaped their attitudes to work in general, and documentation in particular. 
Jang, the HR Planning manager, had been habituated to the flow of salaried office life, vertical 
hierarchies, and complex internal politics inside a conglomerate. Park approached his work as a 
consultant, seeing work as projects for a paying client. Projects should be done based on a 
division of expertise and employees should work should as long as necessary to meet deadlines. 
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The key product ± the PowerPoint document ± should be delivered to and evaluated by 
Executive Cho. For Park, reports required a high attention to detail, for they acted as travelling 
LFRQVRIWKHLUZRUNRXWSXWDQGE\H[WHQVLRQKLVWHDP¶VH[SHUWLse.  
Team Manager Jang was aware of the risks of the consultant style of PowerPoint. In his 
previous company, he had heard many outside consultants whose slides were, in his words, 
fancier than the actual solutions they offered. He saw his job not as based around discrete 
³GHOLYHUDEOHV´EXWDVSDUWRIDSURJUDP-building for the HR team and Sangdo Group in general. 
This included developing innovative HR systems around salary and promotion programs, as well 
as guiding the careers of the three team members under his charge. None of these things could be 
captured in a single PowerPoint document; rather, they took place over the course of years and 
with long-term discussion and diplomacy at the Sangdo subsidiaries and group ownership. To 
Jang, Executive Cho was not the final arbiter in this process, but a hindrance. Jang confided to 
me and others how Executive Cho unnecessarily obsessed over the fine details of presentations, 
opinions which were valid in their own right, but often unnecessary for getting things done, not 
WRPHQWLRQKDUPIXOWRHPSOR\HHV¶ZRUNLQJOLYHV, occasionally leading to major arguments over 
documents. Reporting, particularly internal reporting, was merely an occasion to have a 
discussion, with the owners and with subsidiary managers, around which different projects could 
be worked and reworked. In this sense, while texts are the result of an entextualization process 
with superficially institutional purposes, their mere presence often occasions new contexts for 
talk and action (Haviland 1996; Nozawa 2007).xii 
Requests for PowerPoint documents could not be totally avoided, however, but they 
could be manipulated. When projects required feedback from Executive Cho, Jang would take 
print-outs by himself to shield his team members from any scolding and to better negotiate a 
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project going forward. One of -DQJ¶VIDYRULWHPRYHs was to use the complications of one report 
to delay or simplify another ongoing project, buying concessions from Executive Cho. On 
occasion, he also could get passing approvals from the CEO in the hallway as a way to mitigate 
&KR¶VDQWLFLSDWRU\quibbling. On other occasions, Team Manager Jang downplayed his own 
WHDP¶VH[SHUWSRVLWLRQE\VKDULQJILOHVGLUHFWO\ZLWKVXEVLGLDU\PDQDJHUVWRJHWWKHLUIHHGEDFN
together or by presenting them as sales pitches, reversing the assumed power relations of the 
headquarters expert who commands those below. 
For others, PowerPoint itself represents deeper problems to business operations. When I 
interviewed Senior Advisor Jung, a semi-retired consigliere in the Sangdo Group, my planned 
questions on the history of the group quickly diverted into his own pet theory on documentation 
reform which was elaborated on a large white board in his office. He saw the Sangdo 
conglomerate as deeply flawed, with one of the reasons stemming from myriad forms of 
documentation, related in parWWR.RUHDQV¶XQZLOOLQJQHVVWRVKDUHDQGwork for the collective 
good. He himself had become an adherent of the American ³OHDQPDQDJHPHQW´approach which 
focuses on core elements of manufacturing operations (cash flow, cost accounting, profit 
margins, and so on), making every employee responsible for these. In his view, Sangdo 
managers focused too much attention on PowerPoint documents, leading to wasted time and 
distorted views of baseline information. He advocated instead that the entire management chain 
be simplified by only using a one-page document listing efficiency metrics straight from the 
factory floors, suggesting a closer calibration between objective (first-order) information, the 
medium of documentation, and its final addressee. These one-pagers would go directly to the 
chairman, so he could see the ³ground floor´ (hyeonjang) of his business. This would obviate the 
need for the entire middle manager infrastructure in his view. Importantly, such a document 
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would not be editing: it would be a plain depiction of productive efficiency imagined through 
numeric metrics ± the opposite of the highly stylized PowerPoint (cf. Zaloom 2003: 264-265). 
Despite the fervor of his ideas (and their early success at one small factory), his own office had 
been relegated from the thirty-ninth floor to the third floor of the Sangdo Tower to make way for 
a new executive in the holding company. For Jung to claim that the group should minimize its 
modes of documentation and reliance on PowerPoint was a position that precisely shut him out 
of the internal economy he was criticizing. Moral high grounds can be reached by stair, it seems. 
 More extreme measures have been taken: in 2016, the South Korean credit card giant 
Hyundai Card declared war on PowerPoint in an internal caPSDLJQFDOOHG³=HUR337´7KH
FDPSDLJQZDVDLPHGDWHOLPLQDWLQJWKHXVHRI3RZHU3RLQWRU337IRUVKRUWIRUWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
three-thousand-person workforce. xiii 7KHFDPSDLJQVORJDQZDV³/HW¶VQRWZRUNIRUWKHVDNHRI
PDNLQJUHSRUWV´UHIOHFWLQJDVHQWLPHQWWKDWWLPHVSHQWRQ3RZHU3RLQWUHSRUWVZDV³H[FHVVLYH´
DQGWKDWFRPSDQ\FXOWXUHKDGVLPSO\WUDQVIRUPHGLQWRD³FXOWXUHRIUHSRUWV´ (bogoseo munhwa). 
Hyundai Card employees were encouraged to make reports in other programs like Excel, limit 
WKHPWRRQHRUWZRSDJHVDQGPDNHWKHP³DUJXPHQW-FHQWHUHG´&RPSDQ\FRPSXWHUVZHUHHYHQ
re-programmed to prevent PowerPoint slides from being created at all; existing PowerPoints 
were set to read-only. According to company CEO Chung Tae-\RXQJ¶VSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRQ
)DFHERRNWKH³=HUR337´SURJUDPVDYHGILIW\PLOOLRQSLHFHVRISDSHUDQGXQWROGKRXUVRI
meetings over the its first year (Figure 3 below). 
[Figure 3] 
 
7KHDOOXVLRQWRD³FXOWXUHRIUHSRUWV´PDNHVFOHDUWKDWWKHHPSKDVLVLVQRWRQWKHWHFKQRORJLFDO
medium per se, but how report writing through PowerPoint was contributing to unnecessary 
documentation, particularly in ways that punished report writers. This criticism reflects other 
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normative restrictions on exchange practices run amok in Korea in which dyadic modes of both 
demonstrating authority and signaling deference appear to outstrip their basic social functions, 
such as excessive gift-giving or consumer purchasing (Kendall 1996; Nelson 2000). Despite the 
breadth of the Zero PPT program (and its public relations IDQIDUH+\XQGDL&DUG¶VDSSURDFK
like Senior Advisor JXQJ¶VVWLOOUHVWHGRQDQassumption that institutional functioning could be 
fine-tuned through just the right forms of documentation, not the total removal of documentation 
altogether. For Hyundai, this simply meant reports in other media: Excel documents, one-page 
reports, or in some cases face-to-face or telephone reporting.xiv Such efforts appear as noble 
attempts at reducing .RUHD¶Vseemingly out of control work hours. Yet we can look at them 
another way: a mode for DOLJQLQJRQH¶Vpersonal preferences as institutional goals, while 
minimizing the ability of others to have their own say in the matter.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The powers that inhere in PowerPoint are not the powers of PowerPoint. Whereas 
communications and media scholars have often looked at the enabling and constraining aspects 
of PowerPoint as both technology and genre in the ways it has infiltrated a diverse range of 
institutions (Kernbach et al. 2015), in this article I have argued that an anthropological analysis 
can reveal how a software can become an institutionally privileged circuit for channeling 
different orders of value. I have referred to these as tensions over first-order information (reports, 
plans, and proposals) and second-order information (inferences about those who make them). 
Interestingly, both a labor theory of value and business theories of immediate communication 
converge in believing that these two orders can be separated and measured. This article has 
shown that not only are they difficult to separate in the context of organizations premised on the 
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shared production of documents, but that normative values can make their distinctions 
intentionally invisible. By putatively VDFULILFLQJRQH¶VODERUfor the organization itself, 
individuals can signal their fealty to specific individuals. To Korean office workers who find 
themselves endlessly revising PowerPoint documents ordered by their bosses, the issue is not 
that PowerPoint mediates this relationship with its endless visual information, but which 
relationships become mediated ± or exacerbated ± by it.  
Modern organizational orders, not just managerial corporations, are premised on the 
production of first-order information that is delinked from the authors that compose them, from 
accounting statements to government reports. Second-order interference is seen as parasitic of, or 
at least oppositional to, efforts to produce ³UHDO´information. Information divorced from its 
human influence is a distinction as old as Weber. Efforts to impose new kinds of order, however, 
appear as a way to naturalize other systems as absent interference. Western critiques of Korean 
corporate life are particularly derisive in this regard, often framing the Korean economy as an 
inability to separate business (first-order) from culture itself (a second-order interference): 
Korean corporations are too riddled by internal status politics to operate efficiently, too tied to 
family-style management, and too polite to make note of even imminent dangers (see Gladwell 
2008: 177-223). Such criticisms frame Western capitalist-organizational practice as sufficiently 
normal and unmarked in its efforts for rational documentation and depiction of the market, thus 
ignoring the ways that Western office spaces are equally shaped by second-order norms bleeding 
into first-order ones (see Ho 2009: 73-121). The larger aim of this paper has been to suggest that 
conflicts between these two orders of documentation are not simply embedded in culture (with 
all respect to Polanyi) in non-Western places like Korea, but that such tensions are inherent to 
modern organizational forms premised on both the collective production of objective information 
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on one hand and the individuation of status and membership on the other. The case of Korean 
PowerPoints suggests that the work of aligning these second-order signs into the production of 
first-order information entails its own kind of social crucible within the office. 
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i
 7KLVDUWLFOHXVHV5HYLVHG5RPDQL]DWLRQRU³55´LQthe transcription of Korean to English.  
 
ii See Park (2010) for a broader discussion of the naturalization of linguistic competencies in 
South Korea and its associations with neoliberal contradictions for both hard work and natural 
skills. 
 
iii
 In Korea, these include five non-executive roles that are conventionally standardized for office 
workers across the private sector: sawon, daeri, gwajang, chajang, and bujang. At the executive 
level, peopled positions may vary, but typically include executives (sangmu, isa), presidents or 
CEOs (sajang, daepyo), as well as vice chairmen and chairmen (buhoejang, hoejang). 
 
iv
 This is not to make the reductive point that corporations or organizations should be reduced to 
people and not materials or discourses (see Bashkow [2014] for critiques of this position), but 
UDWKHUWKDWVXFK³FRPSRVLWLRQDO´YLHZVDUHIUHTXHQWO\KRZDFWRUVFRPHWRXQGHUVWDQG
institutions. For instance, most public (and legal) discourse reifies corporations as distinct, 
unified social actors, Korea being no exception; within corporations, however, internal 
perceptions of managerial hierarchies rarely reify corporate action as separate from specific 
offices or powerful individuals. 
 
v
 ³.RUHD¶VODERUSURGXFWLYLW\UDQNVORZLQWKH2(&'´Korea Joongang Daily, May 7, 2018. 
Source: http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3047785 
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vi
 One of the most famous cases involved the Hyundai Group, which upon founder Chung Ju-
\XQJ¶VGHDWKLQIRXQGLWVHOIZLWKRXWDFOHDUVXFFHVVRUWRWKHWKHQ-largest corporate group in 
Korea. Competing claims to succession by surviving sons ± both legitimate and illegitimate ±  
OHGWR+\XQGDL¶VVR-FDOOHG³ZDURISULQFHV´LQZKLFKWKHJURXSZDVSURJUHVVLYHO\GLVPDQWOHG
into separate conglomerates, including Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group, Hyundai Merchant 
Marine, and Hyundai Heavy Industries. See Steers (1999).   
 
vii
 See Silverstein (2003) for a detailed linguistic anthropological account of the concept of 
³RUGHUVRILQGH[LFDOLW\´ZKHUHLQVSLUDWLRQIRUWKLVIUDPLQJZDVGUDZQ 
 
viii
 In an online survey conducted by website Job Korea, 97% of office workers were said to 
practice nunchi in the office with the most common exDPSOHVEHLQJ³VWD\LQJDWZRUNDIWHU
RIILFLDOTXLWWLQJWLPH´2WKHUH[DPSOHVLQFOXGHG³DGMXVWLQJRQH¶VYDFDWLRQVFKHGXOHWRRWKHUV´
³ILQGLQJZRUNWRGRZKHQWKHUHLVQRLPPHGLDWHZRUN´³KHOSLQJRXWDWHDPPHPEHUZLWKXUJHQW
ZRUN´DQG³ZRUNLQJKDUGHULIWKHUHLVSUHVVXUHWRGHOLYHUUHVXOWV´6RXUFH³RIRIILFHZRUNV
practice nunchi DWWKHRIILFH«:KDW¶VWRSRQWKHOLVW"Maeil Gyeongje. July 22, 2016. 
http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?no=526656&year=2016. 
 
ix
 2QHRIWKHSULQFLSOHVWKDW([HFXWLYH&KRUHLWHUDWHGZDV³0(&(´RU³PXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYH
FROOHFWLYHO\H[KDXVWLYH´7KHDFURQ\PFRPHVIURP0F.LQVH\	&R¶VSXEOLFO\SXEOLVKHGDGYLFH
on how to develop PowerPoints. Under MECE logic, one has to identify all possible members of 
a category (CE) and make sure these members do not overlap with each other (ME). 
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x
 This reflects widely diffuse models of dyadic authority in South Korean society in which 
individuals are socialized to see themselves as above or below others by age or rank, practices 
inculcated even among young children. See Ahn (2016). 
 
xi
 Despite, or perhaps because of, rigid labor laws in Korea that make it difficult to fire individual 
employees at will, acts of social exclusion or social exiling are an ever-present threat, 
encapsulated in terms such as wangdda (an excluded person) or ddadollinda (to outcast 
someone). 
 
xii
 <DWHV	2UOLNRZVNLGHVFULEHDSUDFWLFHNQRZQDV³JKRVW-VOLGLQJ´LQZKLFK$PHULFDQ
consultants refused to finalize their PowerPoint drafts with clients, so as to avoid explicit 
commitments to work itself and to keep projects open (and presumably billable). 
 
xiii
 The policy was later extended to sister companies Hyundai Life, Hyundai Capital, and 
Hyundai Commercial. 
 
xiv
 ³:DVWLQJWLPHDQGODERURQUHSRUWGHVLJQV>+\XQGDL&DUG@JHWVULGRI337DQGVXEVWLWXWHVLW
with one piece of paper´Chosun Ilbo, June 6, 2016. Source: 
http://economyplus.chosun.com/special/special_view.php?boardName=C00&t_num=9863.  
